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Abstract
Decentralized Internet is booming. People are fasci-
nated by its promise that users can truly own their data.
However, in a decentralized Internet, completing a task
usually involvesmultiple nodes with mutual distrust. Such
distrust might eventually become a major obstacle for
the growth of the decentralized Internet. In this paper,
we analyze the distrust using a simple model and high-
light the properties required to faithfully accomplish one
task in a decentralized Internet. We also introduce our
draft solution—PIXIU, a framework to mitigate the dis-
trust among different nodes. In PIXIU, we design and
utilize trust-λ and decentralized executor to achieve the
above needed properties.
1 Introduction
Surveys and reports suggest that current Internet is highly
centralized [1, 2]. In a centralized Internet, as users, our
(private) data are collected and stored in some centralized
data silos, which are out of our control. This misplacement
of ownership might lead to catastrophic consequences—
data abuse [6], data manipulation [13, 14], data breach [3]
and so on.
Users should be in control of and be empowered to mon-
etize their own data. In order to achieve this goal, decen-
tralized Internet has been proposed. Though immature,
decentralized Internet is able to offer most of the func-
tionalities that nowadays centralized Internet provides, in-
cluding websites [15], online marketplace [10], social net-
work [4], online collaboration [7], video sharing [5] and
more [9, 11, 12].
Different from current centralized architecture, decen-
tralized Internet is, by design, a peer-to-peer network
which allows individual users to truly own their data. In a
decentralized Internet, user data are stored in PODs [11]
(Personal Online Datastores) which are controlled by users
themselves. And, users can choose to run applications in
their own PODs for fun and profit.
However, there are trust issues in such decentralized In-
ternet. Instead of trusting a few giant tech companies, a
user now has to trust many (if not all) nodes in the peer-
to-peer network, which she may or may not know. Indeed,
a user can choose which nodes to collaborate with. But,
the question still remains—how can a user make sure that
the nodes, which have been granted the read permission,
will not stealthily leak the data, or alter the application,
or—even—how to ascertain that they actually do anything
instead of returning an arbitrary result?
We believe such distrust is deep-seated in the nature of
decentralization and it might eventually become the major
obstacle for the growth of the decentralized Internet. In
this paper, we introduce a simple model to systematically
analyse different types of distrust. And, in order to tackle
these problems, we design PIXIU, a framework to mitigate
the distrust in the decentralized Internet.
In our distrust model, multiple PODs and one data con-
sumer together want to finish one task. An executor takes
the data from PODs and the task from the data consumer
as inputs, and produces the result. All the participants mu-
tually distrust each other. There are concerns about the
data counterfeit, data stealing, task stealing, execution cor-
ruption, and so on.
PIXIU is designed to mitigate the above distrust. In its
core are trust-λ and the decentralized executor. In PIXIU,
we split one task (e.g., a query, a machine learning train-
ing) into steps, execute each step separately in a trust-λ,
and chain the trust-λs chronologically as one decentralized
executor. Each trust-λ consists of several trusted execution
environments (TEE), so that no data nor the execution leak
outside the decentralized executor.
PIXIU’s ethos is pragmatic. It assumes TEE can pro-
vide both confidentiality and integrity, which—in reality—
is not always true [8, 39]. However, we argue that, in prac-
tice, the violations of such assumption can be restricted by
(i) extra security techniques to solidify the TEE and, more
importantly, (ii) thanks to the fine-granularity of each step,
the attacks would be economically insufficient.
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2 Distrust model
In this section, we are going to introduce our distrust
model in the decentralized Internet. We assume that the
users’ data have already been stored in their PODs. How
to collect data into PODs is out of the topic of this paper.
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Figure 1: The workflow of executing a task in the decentralized
Internet.
Figure 1 depicts an abstract workflow of a task in the de-
centralized Internet. A data consumer starts a task which
includes a piece of code and a specification of what data
should be its inputs. Some PODs have the data needed
by this task and (suppose) they allow such a task to access
these data.
An executor takes the task from the data consumer and
the corresponding data from PODs as inputs, executes the
task’s code, and outputs the result to the data consumer.
In addition, the executor generates an execution proof for
both sides to verify this procedure. Note that the executor
is an abstract entity that might locate in one or multiple
nodes in the decentralized Internet.
In the above workflow, we have three participants with
mutual distrust: the data consumer, PODs, and the execu-
tor. PODs are responsible for providing genuine data, but
are fear of either executor or data consumer stealing their
data. On the other hand, the data consumer worries that
the PODs may provide fake data, and the task code are
stolen or not faithfully executed by the executor. In a de-
centralized network, the participants can be anyone in the
world, hence they naturally distrust each other.
In the following, we summarize the properties required
by the decentralized Internet to mitigate the distrust.
• Data privacy. PODs distrust the data consumers that
they may steal the data, or the executor might leak
the data. Data privacy requires that only a bounded
amount of user data can be revealed (i.e., differential
privacy) to the data consumer and the executor.
• Data authenticity. Data consumers worry that the
PODs may sabotage the task by sending fake data as
inputs. Data authenticity requires that the input data
can be authenticated, otherwise, should be explicitly
tagged as alleged.
• Task privacy. The task may contain some confiden-
tial logic of data consumers’ (e.g., the architecture of
a neural network, ranking algorithm) that the execu-
tor should not know. Task privacy requires that the
executor learns nothing about the task logic.
• Execution integrity. Data consumers concern that the
result might be bogus, as the task’s code is not faith-
fully executed. Execution integrity requires that the
code runs as written by the executor.
• Accountability. Inevitably, executing a task in a dis-
tributed setup will encounter failures, errors, bugs,
misconfigurations, and so on. Accountability re-
quires that, for one failed task, all the participants are
able to pinpoint and agree on where went wrong.
• Traceability. When users need some processed
data (e.g., some statitics, a trained machine learning
model), they want to understand how the data were
generated. Traceability requires that one can find
and verify the history of any piece of data generated
within the decentralized Internet.
3 A draft solution: PIXIU
In order to fulfill the requires in previous section, we de-
sign PIXIU. PIXIU is a framework built on top of a de-
centralized Internet, where all the participating nodes are
treated equally in a peer-to-peer manner. Each node can
play one or multiple roles—PODs, data consumers, or the
executor—within each task. And, PIXIU, as the frame-
work, organizes and coordinates these roles to finish the
tasks.
In this section, we are going to introduce the basic build-
ing block of PIXIU named trust-λ (§3.1) which provides
execution integrity and task privacy; then, we describe de-
centralized executor (§3.2), the key to achieve the data
privacy and data authenticity; finally, we will justify our
assumption in §3.3.
Due to the space limit, we have to skip other pieces
of PIXIU which are also indispensable. In specific, we
make the following assumptions, which should have been
achieved by other components of PIXIU.
• We assume a fixed peer-to-peer network with all nodes
equipped with TEE.
• We assume all PODs are willing to expose their data
(i.e., grant read permission) under the guarantee of data
privacy.
• We assume that, for one task, both PODs and the data
consumer have agreed, beforehand, how to split this
task into trust-λs.
• We assume that PIXIU can always find the relevant data
from PODs and qualified nodes as executors.
3.1 Properties of trust-λ
A trust-λ is the basic execution unit in our system. A
task can be divided into multiple trust-λs. Each trust-λ
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has three properties: first, it has only one entry point and
one exit point for data; second, the privacy of code and
data within one trust-λ is protected; third, the execution of
logic cannot be tampered with.
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Figure 2: The inner process of one trust-λ. PIXIU-Box ensures
only one entry for input and one exit for output.
The properties of trust-λ are enforced by a software and
hardware co-design. Figure 2 shows the process of one
trust-λ. Each trust-λ is composed of three components:
one data validator, one sandbox and one proof generator.
The data validator is the one component that accepts out-
side data. It checks the input data using proof (described
below), and then passes the data to the sandbox. The sand-
box ensures that the function running inside cannot send
data out by disabling all I/O and restricting access to mem-
ory out of enclave.
The third component generates a proof of execution to
show that the output data are indeed generated from the
input data and algorithm. A proof contains sufficient in-
formation of the data flow, but no sensitive data that may
reveal user’s personal information. A typical proof only
has hashes of the input data and the function. The proof
generator will sign the proof with its own private key. The
private key is initialized when the node joins the PIXIU
network.
All of the three components are running within hard-
ware enclaves, so that they can attest each other, offer at-
testation to outsiders and protect both integrity and privacy
of the code and data. They run on the same node so that
their secure channels are based on shared memory buffers.
3.2 Decentralized executor
A decentralized executor is an instantiation of the executor
in a decentralized Internet, which consists of a set of trust-
λs. Figure 3 depicts the architecture of a decentralized
executor.
In this example, the whole task has been split into mul-
tiple trust-λs with different purposes: data prover, task
execution, and differential privacy. First, the input data
flow from PODs into the data prover, in which the pro-
gram authenticates the input data. If valid, the data flows
into the task execution to finish the essential task the data
consumer provides. The result, instead of directly return-
task
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Figure 3: The architecture of PIXIU’s decentralized executor.
ing to the data consumer, has to go through another differ-
ential privacy trust-λ, which guarantees that the sensitive
personal data would not be leaked. Finally, the result is
delivered to the data consumer.
All these procedures are executed within trust-λs,
which, because of trust-λ’s properties, are faithfully exe-
cuted with confidentiality. And, each of the trust-λ com-
mits an execution proof to a public storage, which PODs
and the data consumer can examine.
One decentralized executor usually has a chain of trust-
λs. The integrity of the decentralized executor is ensured
by encryption and key management. Specifically, the data
consumer acts as a dispatcher. It first recrutes several in-
stances that runs the trust-λ it needs, then sends the list to
the data owner. The data owner first attests each instance.
After that, it will generate keys and send them to each in-
stance in a way that the output of one trust-λ can only be
decrypted by the next trust-λ.
In the following, we’re going to describe several com-
mon components in a decentralized executor.
Data prover is responsible for providing data authentic-
ity in the decentralized executor. Depending on the type
of data, there are multiple ways to authenticate a piece of
data. If the data have been signed by the hardware (e.g.,
camera [27]), the validation can be as simple as verifying
a signature. Similar case applies to the data signed by their
source organization (e.g., health data [28]).
Another type of data, which have machine-checkable
sources (e.g., shopping record, search history), can be au-
thenticated by logging into the corresponding website and
verifying that the provided data entry does exist. TEE tech-
nique [35] is able to guarantee that user’s login is secure,
as well as the validation is faithful.
Admittedly, there are cases that it is hard or even im-
possible to authenticate the data. PIXIU requires that these
data should be tagged as “alleged” and the data consumers
should take their own risks to trust these data.
Differential privacy guarantees the data privacy in
PIXIU. Differential privacy [25] is a statistical technique
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that aims to protect privacy of individual users while still
allowing statistical queries to these data. Previous sys-
tems demonstrate that differential privacy can be applied
transparently to a lot of tasks (e.g., machine learning [16],
statistic analysis [26], SQL query [33]). Hence, PIXIU
can leverage these systems to build our differential privacy
trust-λ. Investigating what tasks can (or cannot) use differ-
ential privacy and how to achieve them in practice is our
future work.
Execution proofs empower PIXIU with the accountabil-
ity and traceability. Any participant in one task is able to
verify the whole chain of trust-λs via examining (check-
ing the signature and comparing the hashes) the series of
execution proofs on the public storage. Since execution
proofs are signed by trust-λs, they cannot be forged.
Specifically, PODs can ensure that their data flow
through a differential privacy trust-λ, so that data privacy
is enforced. And data consumers can ascertain that the
input data have been authenticated by a data prover trust-
λ. As for the data generated within PIXIU, anyone can
track the history of the processing and find the original
data sources.
3.3 Justify PIXIU’s assumption
PIXIU assumes that TEE can provide both execution in-
tegrity and confidentiality. However, in reality, attacks,
like side channel [39] and L1TF [8], may successfully
steal data from enclaves. In the following, we try to ar-
gue that the violation of such assumption can be restricted
by the two schemes below.
One way to reduce the attacking surface, besides ap-
plying Intel’s latest patch, is to restrict the software
stack underneath enclaves with trusted hardware like TPM
(Trusted Platform Module) and Intel TXT (Trusted eXecu-
tion Technology). The execution nodes may have differ-
ent security levels. For examle, a node depending entirely
on Intel SGX (Software Guard eXtension) is considered
as mid-level security, which could be vulnerable to side
channel attacks. A more secure node can run a formally
verified kernel and use SGX as well, and nothing else to
minimize the attacking surface.
On the other hand, our methodology of dividing a task
into multiple trust-λ can increase the cost of an attack, as
well as decrease its gain, making it economically insuf-
ficient. Since trust-λs are isolated with each other, the
data leaked in a single trust-λ can be very limited and
an attacker may need to compromise many nodes before
achieving one sucessful attack. Further, the functions that
are considered as more important can be deployed to the
nodes with higher security level.
4 Real-world use cases
In this section, we are going to present several real-world
use cases of PIXIU.
4.1 Case 1: advertisements
In this application scenario, advertisers are data con-
sumers. They want to run their advertisement recom-
mendation algorithms on users’ PODs and deliver the ad-
vertisements about their products to the potential buyers.
Clearly, users do not want their data to be leaked to the
advertisers, and (perhaps) the advertisers also want their
recommendation algorithms to be secret.
With PIXIU, an advertiser can send its advertisement to
the target users without learning who they are. The ad-
vertiser can filter out the non-target users by setting condi-
tions in the task. For example, as a video game seller, it
can specify that its advertisements will only send to those
who have a purchase record of a Nintendo Switch. The
advertiser can check the advertisement delivery by examin-
ing the execution proofs committed by each trust-λ. PODs
can also make sure that their personal data (e.g., whether
have a Nintendo Switch) have not been leaked to the ad-
vertiser, in the same way.
4.2 Case 2: financial data query
Some organizations (e.g., banks, financial companies) and
individuals have many financial records. Other companies,
researchers, or individuals may try to understand some
statistics about the overall financial status, or the financial
condition of a particular group of people. However, nowa-
days, the data owners are unwilling to share their data, and
the queriers are afraid of that their queries will be leaked.
In this scenario, data providers need to ensure no data
leakage, and for the queriers, they need to keep their
queries private. With PIXIU, a PIR (Private Information
Retrieve) trust-λ can be inserted into the task to protect the
query processing from the data providers. The query will
be encrypted and executed by the PODs of data provider
without revealing which data have been touched. Since the
data providers do not trust any query, they will also lever-
age differential privacy to ensure no personal information
will be leaked through the result.
4.3 Case 3: machine learning training
Machine learning brings convenience to people’s lives:
machine translation, autocorrect, auto captioning, etc.
Most of these machine learning algorithms require training
on substantial data. And some personalization functional-
ities require the peeking of user’s own data. People have
been forced to choose between convenience and privacy.
PIXIU can make this dilemma obsolete.
With PIXIU, people can opt in to volunteer their data
for machine learning tasks, without the worry of losing
privacy. These machine learning tasks can in turn be used
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for their own benefits, such as personal assistant, search
personalization, etc.
Imagine a researcher wants to train a language model
of modern day Americans, and she is interested in mak-
ing use of the abundance of training data lying in peo-
ple’sPODs. In this case she would be a data consumer,
who specifies the task and gets the word out. Some users
that store their text messages in their PODs may now sign
up. Data consumer starts the job in an enclave (consumer
enclave), which updates the global model. She then sends
algorithm to user’s PODs which will run as trust-λ.
The learning process involves several rounds of com-
muncation between consumer enclave and user enclaves.
In each round, the consumer enclave distributes the global
model. Each user enclave updates the global model with
local data using stochastic gradient descent, encrypts pa-
rameters, and sends it back to the consumer enclave. The
consumer enclave then collects the encrypted parameters,
which it cannot decrypt. But it can aggregate the param-
eters and then decrypt the result. After a few rounds of
updates, the global model stablizes, and training is done.
4.4 Case 4: secure polls and surveys
Polls and surveys can be done on PIXIU. Survey conduc-
tors need integrity of the result, and survey takers need
discretion.
Say a company is trying to conduct a customer survey,
to learn about how a product is received by the market.
In this case, it would be the data consumer. Participating
users can authenticate their legitimacy throught an identity
verification protocal (e.g., cryptographic proof of member-
ship). The demographic data can be filled out automati-
cally using the data in PODs. Then the user can communi-
cate their encrypted answers securely to the executor. The
executor then generates survey results, without revealing
the raw data. Eventually, a secure polling system may lead
to a secure voting system.
5 Related work
Decentralized system. There are multiple decentralized
systems [21, 22, 34] designed to give back the control of
data to users. Solid [34], a decentralized platform for so-
cial web applications, defines a series of rich protocols and
suggests the creation of a POD, which is owned by individ-
ual users and stores their data. Amber [21] and Oort [22]
provide global queries to efficiently collect and monitor
relevant data created by all the users, which enables cross-
user data applications. Instead of providingmore function-
alities in a decentralized setup, PIXIU focuses on taming
the distrust within these functionalities.
TEE. Many previous works leverage TEE to protect ex-
ecution in untrusted environment [18, 19, 23, 32, 37].
Ryoan [32] proposes a distributed sandbox mechanism
that enables a user to process her private data (e.g., gene)
by multiple untrusted algorithms on different platforms.
Our design is inspired by Ryoan but targets a different
problem: the data owner is not the consumer, which leads
to a totally different threat model. For example, Ryoan
does not need to consider the fake data problem or privacy
leakage between data owner and consumer, while PIXIU
considers both.
Cryptographic tools. There is another thread of sys-
tems [17, 29, 30, 38] that leverage model cryptographic
tools, such as FHE (Fully-Homomorphic Encryption),
MPC (secure Multi-Party Computation), PIR (Private In-
formation Retrieval), to completely get rid of the trust
among participants. PIXIU is complementary to them.
Meanwhile, these methods can be implemented within
trust-λ as a replacement of TEE. However, as far as we
know, adopting these techniques usually imposes signifi-
cant overheads, hence we choose to use TEE as our current
option.
Privacy-preserving machine learning. Federated learn-
ing [36] is a learning scheme that allows a model to be
trained on remote and decentralized data. This protects
privacy to some extend because data stay where they are.
Cryptographic tools have been used to prevent adversarial
inference of individual data [20]. It is worth mentioning
that multiple attacks on federated learning have been pro-
posed [31].
Another line of efforts has been on acheving differential
privacy with random noise mechanisms [16, 24]. They are
pertinent on particular machine learning algorithms, and
proved differential privacy parameters. PIXIU can seam-
lessly accomodate these designs.
6 Conclusion
Decentralization is not just about data (e.g., PODs) and ex-
ecution (e.g., distributed computing), it is also about trust.
The decoupling of three roles: data owner, data consumer
and executor, brings new challenges to the trust model as
well as the system design. PIXIU proposes a decentral-
ized execution framework, where each step of execution
goes with proofs of data and code. Multiple steps can be
connected to run various tasks with code and data from dif-
ferent roles. Currently, PIXIU leverages hardware TEE to
achieve better practicability. It can also use cryptographic
tools including MPC and FHE according to different sce-
narios.
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